Recent objections to perfect knowledge and classical approaches to omniscience
Patrick Grim and Einar Duenger Bohn have recently argued that there can be no perfectly knowing Being. In particular, they urge that the object of omniscience is logically absurd (Grim) or requires an impossible maximal point of all knowledge (Bohn). I argue that, given a more classical notion of om...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electronic/Print Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Marquette Univ. Press
[2016]
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| En: |
Philosophy & theology
Año: 2016, Volumen: 28, Número: 1, Páginas: 259-270 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Grim, Patrick
/ Dios
/ Saber
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| Clasificaciones IxTheo: | AB Filosofía de la religión KAJ Época contemporánea |
| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Sumario: | Patrick Grim and Einar Duenger Bohn have recently argued that there can be no perfectly knowing Being. In particular, they urge that the object of omniscience is logically absurd (Grim) or requires an impossible maximal point of all knowledge (Bohn). I argue that, given a more classical notion of omniscience found in Aquinas and Augustine, we can shift the focus of perfect knowledge from what that being must know to the mode of that being’s understanding. Since Grim and Bohn focus on the object rather than mode of God’s knowledge, this classical approach to omniscience undermines their objections. |
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| ISSN: | 0890-2461 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: Philosophy & theology
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/philtheol20167553 |