Philippa Foot's So-called Achilles' Heel: On the Distinctiveness of Her Grammatical Naturalism
Philippa Foot's attempt in Natural Goodness to defend the claim that moral goodness is a form of species-specific natural goodness and that immorality is a natural defect has elicited a number of challenges. For instance, Scott Woodcock presents the following dilemma: Foot's account of nat...
Published in: | American catholic philosophical quarterly |
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Main Author: | |
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2017]
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In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
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Further subjects: | B
Foot, Philippa
B Naturalism B NATURAL Goodness (Book) B Normativity (Ethics) B Immorality |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | Philippa Foot's attempt in Natural Goodness to defend the claim that moral goodness is a form of species-specific natural goodness and that immorality is a natural defect has elicited a number of challenges. For instance, Scott Woodcock presents the following dilemma: Foot's account of natural normativity either yields morally objectionable results, or there exists an appeal to a normative standard not grounded in natural norms. I contend that the Footian Neo-Aristotelian approach possesses the resources necessary for an adequate answer to this dilemma. I argue that Foot's naturalism does wind up with a normative standard not grounded in empirically typical natural norms but that it is no Achilles' heel. To support this thesis, I contend that such a standard appears inappropriate only if one assumes Foot is endeavoring to justify or establish a substantive conception of human goodness and defect, something she is not attempting. |
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ISSN: | 2153-8441 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpq201737113 |