How Not to Argue against Materialism: On Oderberg's Storage Problem Argument
The storage problem is the problem of explaining how concepts could be stored in the mind if the mind is something material. David Oderberg has defended the immateriality of the human intellect on the basis of the storage problem. he general idea of the argument is that concepts possess features tha...
| Auteur principal: | |
|---|---|
| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publié: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2016]
|
| Dans: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Année: 2016, Volume: 90, Numéro: 3, Pages: 455-476 |
| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Thomism
B ODERBERG, David |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) |
| Résumé: | The storage problem is the problem of explaining how concepts could be stored in the mind if the mind is something material. David Oderberg has defended the immateriality of the human intellect on the basis of the storage problem. he general idea of the argument is that concepts possess features that make them categorially incapable of being stored in any material locus. Yet, they are stored in the mind. Hence, the mind is immaterial. In this paper I propose that Oderberg's argument cannot be accepted. First, I argue that on one reading the argument leads to absurdity and is inconsistent with Oderberg's Thomism. Secondly, I argue that even on another, weaker reading of the argument, Oderberg has no plausible and adequate grounds for accepting it, and the grounds he does provide in favor of the argument seem in tension with Thomism. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2153-8441 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: American catholic philosophical quarterly
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpq20166993 |