Against the Permissibility of Attempted Wife-Poisoning
The Aristotelian-Thomist claim is that external actions can be morally evaluated when they are voluntary (which includes being based on reasonably accurate knowledge of what an agent is doing), absent which, in effect, we evaluate outcomes, not acts. Also, in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition the i...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Philosophy Documentation Center
[2019]
|
In: |
American catholic philosophical quarterly
Year: 2019, Volume: 93, Issue: 1, Pages: 53-74 |
Further subjects: | B
THOMSON, Judith Jarvis
B Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) B ARISTOTELIANISM (Philosophy) B THOMAS, Aquinas, Saint, ca. 1225-1274 B Thomists |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) |
MARC
LEADER | 00000naa a22000002 4500 | ||
---|---|---|---|
001 | 1588246523 | ||
003 | DE-627 | ||
005 | 20190301095055.0 | ||
007 | cr uuu---uuuuu | ||
008 | 190301s2019 xx |||||o 00| ||eng c | ||
024 | 7 | |a 10.5840/acpq20181128164 |2 doi | |
035 | |a (DE-627)1588246523 | ||
035 | |a (DE-576)518246523 | ||
035 | |a (DE-599)BSZ518246523 | ||
040 | |a DE-627 |b ger |c DE-627 |e rda | ||
041 | |a eng | ||
084 | |a 1 |2 ssgn | ||
100 | 1 | |a White, Craig M. |e VerfasserIn |4 aut | |
245 | 1 | 0 | |a Against the Permissibility of Attempted Wife-Poisoning |c Craig M. White |
264 | 1 | |c [2019] | |
336 | |a Text |b txt |2 rdacontent | ||
337 | |a Computermedien |b c |2 rdamedia | ||
338 | |a Online-Ressource |b cr |2 rdacarrier | ||
520 | |a The Aristotelian-Thomist claim is that external actions can be morally evaluated when they are voluntary (which includes being based on reasonably accurate knowledge of what an agent is doing), absent which, in effect, we evaluate outcomes, not acts. Also, in the Aristotelian-Thomist tradition the internal act of the will is paramount. These claims contrast with some current theorizing, e.g., by Judith Jarvis Thomson, that morally evaluates actions separately from agents, downplaying the internal act. Taking cases from current authors that revolve around ignorance of key facts, I critique their theorizing on the basis of the nature of agency, the nature of abstraction, the moral language we use in describing acts, the need for reasonably complete descriptions of acts, and the tendency of act evaluations to "leak" into agent evaluations in objective theories. I then describe how Thomas Aquinas's account of moral evaluation avoids these problems and provides a superior, multi-dimensional framework for moral evaluation. | ||
650 | 4 | |a ARISTOTELIANISM (Philosophy) | |
650 | 4 | |a Ignorance (Theory of knowledge) | |
650 | 4 | |a THOMAS, Aquinas, Saint, ca. 1225-1274 | |
650 | 4 | |a Thomists | |
650 | 4 | |a THOMSON, Judith Jarvis | |
773 | 0 | 8 | |i Enthalten in |t American catholic philosophical quarterly |d Charlottesville, Va. : Philosophy Documentation Center, 1990 |g 93(2019), 1, Seite 53-74 |h Online-Ressource |w (DE-627)372353592 |w (DE-600)2122401-8 |w (DE-576)47637314X |x 2153-8441 |7 nnns |
773 | 1 | 8 | |g volume:93 |g year:2019 |g number:1 |g pages:53-74 |
856 | |u https://doi.org/10.5840/acpq20181128164 |x doi |3 Volltext | ||
936 | u | w | |d 93 |j 2019 |e 1 |h 53-74 |
951 | |a AR | ||
ELC | |a 1 | ||
LOK | |0 000 xxxxxcx a22 zn 4500 | ||
LOK | |0 001 3057061826 | ||
LOK | |0 003 DE-627 | ||
LOK | |0 004 1588246523 | ||
LOK | |0 005 20190301095055 | ||
LOK | |0 008 190301||||||||||||||||ger||||||| | ||
LOK | |0 040 |a DE-Tue135 |c DE-627 |d DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 092 |o n | ||
LOK | |0 852 |a DE-Tue135 | ||
LOK | |0 852 1 |9 00 | ||
LOK | |0 935 |a ixzs |a ixzo | ||
ORI | |a SA-MARC-ixtheoa001.raw |