RT Article
T1 Compunction, Second-Personal Morality, and Moral Reasons
JF Ethical theory and moral practice
VO 21
IS 3
SP 719
OP 733
A1 Miller, Dale E. 1966-
LA English
PB Springer Science + Business Media B. V
YR 2018
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1584861754
AB In The Second-Person Standpoint and subsequent essays, Stephen Darwall develops an account of morality that is “second-personal” in virtue of holding that what we are morally obligated to do is what others can legitimately demand that we do, i.e., what they can hold us accountable for doing through moral reactive attitudes like blame. Similarly, what it would be wrong for us to do is what others can legitimately demand that we abstain from doing. As part of this account, Darwall argues for the proposition that we have a distinctive “second-personal reason” to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong-actions, an “authority-regarding” reason that derives from the legitimate demands the “moral community” makes of us. I show that Darwall offers an insufficient case for this proposition. My criticism of this aspect of Darwall's account turns in part on the fact that we have compunction-based or “compunctive” reasons to fulfill all of our obligations and to avoid all wrong actions, a type of reason that Darwall seemingly overlooks.
K1 Compunction
K1 Darwall
K1 Moral Reasons
K1 Reactive attitudes
K1 Second-personal morality
K1 Second-personal reasons
K1 Stephen
DO 10.1007/s10677-018-9918-2