Are There Distinctively Moral Reasons?
A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wan...
| Authors: | ; |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 載入...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2018]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2018, 卷: 21, 發布: 3, Pages: 699-717 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Self-other asymmetry
B social practices B Reasons B Categorical B Responsibility |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
| 總結: | A dogma of contemporary normative theorizing holds that some reasons are distinctively moral while others are not. Call this view Reasons Pluralism. This essay looks at four approaches to vindicating the apparent distinction between moral and non-moral reasons. In the end, however, all are found wanting. Though not dispositive, the failure of these approaches supplies strong evidence that the dogma of Reasons Pluralism is ill-founded. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-018-9919-1 |
