Richard Kilvington and the Theory of Obligations
Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretat...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2015
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| In: |
Vivarium
Year: 2015, 卷: 53, 發布: 2/4, Pages: 391-404 |
| IxTheo Classification: | KAF Church history 1300-1500; late Middle Ages VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Obligations
sophisms
ex impossibili quodlibet
Kilvington
Burley
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| 在線閱讀: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (Publisher) |
| 總結: | Kretzmann and Spade were led by Richard Kilvington’s proposed revisions to the rules of obligations in his discussion of the 47th sophism in his Sophismata to claim that the purpose of obligational disputations was the same as that of counterfactual reasoning. Angel d’Ors challenged this interpretation, realising that the reason for Kilvington’s revision was precisely that he found the art of obligation unsuited to the kind of reasoning that lay at the heart of the sophismatic argument. In his criticism, Kilvington focused on a technique used by Walter Burley to force a respondent to grant an arbitrary falsehood and similar to Lewis and Langford’s famous defence of ex impossibili quodlibet. Kilvington observed that just as in obligational disputation one may be obliged to grant a false proposition and deny a true one, so in counterfactual reasoning one may be obliged to doubt a proposition whose truth or falsity one knows, on pain of contradiction. |
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| 實物描述: | Online-Ressource |
| ISSN: | 1568-5349 |
| Contains: | In: Vivarium
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/15685349-12341306 |
