RT Article
T1 Stroud, Hegel, Heidegger: A Transcendental Argument
JF International journal for the study of skepticism
VO 8
IS 3
SP 167
OP 191
A1 Davies, Kim 1966-
LA English
PB Brill
YR 2018
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1581471513
AB This paper presents an original, ambitious, truth-directed transcendental argument for the existence of an ‘external world’. It begins with a double-headed starting-point: Stroud’s own remarks on the necessary conditions of language in general, and Hegel’s critique of the “fear of error.” The paper argues that the sceptical challenge requires a particular critical concept of thought as that which may diverge from reality, and that this concept is possible only through reflection on situations of error, in which how things are thought (or experienced) to be diverges from how things really are with independent items in an objective world. The existence of such a world is therefore a necessary condition of the possibility of scepticism: such scepticism is therefore false. I defend the argument against objections from Stroud’s sceptic and others. Drawing on Heidegger, the paper concludes by indicating that the chain of necessary conditions includes practical engagement with the world.
K1 Transcendental Argument : external world : Stroud : Hegel : Heidegger : necessary conditions of the possibility of language : necessary conditions of the possibility of error
DO 10.1163/22105700-20171282