Loke on the Infinite God Objection
In a recent article, Andrew Ter Ern Loke raises several objections to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef's exposition and response to the so-called 'Infinite God Objection' to the kalām cosmological argument. According to this objection, the argument against the possibility of...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
---|---|
Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
[2018]
|
Στο/Στη: |
Sophia
Έτος: 2018, Τόμος: 57, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 151-156 |
Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός NBC Δόγμα του Θεού |
Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Omniscience
B Kalām cosmological argument B Infinite God objection B Abstract objects |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
Σύνοψη: | In a recent article, Andrew Ter Ern Loke raises several objections to Jacobus Erasmus and Anné Hendrik Verhoef's exposition and response to the so-called 'Infinite God Objection' to the kalām cosmological argument. According to this objection, the argument against the possibility of an actual infinite brings into question the view that God's knowledge is infinite. Erasmus and Verhoef's solution to this objection, which Loke criticises, depends on an unusual account of omniscience. In this article, I respond to Loke and show that his objections are unsuccessful. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1873-930X |
Αναφορά: | Kritik von "On the Infinite God Objection (2016)"
|
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Sophia
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-017-0606-9 |