Does Molinism Reconcile Freedom and Foreknowledge?
John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly's recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer's claim is...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2018]
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2018, Volume: 10, Issue: 2, Pages: 131-148 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Molinism
/ Freedom of action
/ Prescience
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IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NCB Personal ethics VB Hermeneutics; Philosophy |
Further subjects: | B
Molinism
B Free Will B Middle Knowledge B Foreknowledge |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Summary: | John Martin Fischer has argued that Molinism does not constitute a response to the argument that divine foreknowledge is incompatible with human freedom. I argue that T. Ryan Byerly's recent work on the mechanics of foreknowledge sheds light on this issue. It shows that Fischer's claim is ambiguous, and that it may turn out to be false on at least one reading, but only if the Molinist can explain how God knows true counterfactuals of freedom. |
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Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v10i2.1983 |