RT Article
T1 The Limits of Double Effect
JF Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
VO 89
SP 143
OP 157
A1 Giebel, Heidi M.
LA English
YR 2015
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1578190819
AB Ir. the decades since Anscombe re-introduced the distinction between intention and foresight into philosophical ethics, supporters and critics of the related principle of double effect (PDE) have displayed disagreement and confusion about its application and scope. The key to correct interpretation and application of PDE, I argue, is recognition of its limits: (1) the principle does not include an account of the goodness or badness of effects; (2) it does not include an account of intention; (3) PDE does not specify a particular action as right or obligatory; and (4) rhe privacy of intention limits its application in interpersonal and legal contexts. While all four of these features are "limits" in the sense that they are things PDE does not do, I argue that (a) only the fourth is a real limitation or disadvantage of the principle--and (b) none of the limits implies that the principle should be rejected.
K1 contextual analysis
K1 DOUBLE effect (Ethics)
K1 Intention
K1 Interpersonal Relations
K1 Philosophy
DO 10.5840/acpaproc201692946