RT Article
T1 A New Argument for the Incompatibility of Hylomorphism and Metaphysical Naturalism
JF Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
VO 89
SP 119
OP 130
A1 Dumsday, Travis
LA English
YR 2015
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1578190746
AB Within the substance ontology literature in recent analytic metaphysics, four principal theories are in competition: substratum theory, bundle theory, primitive substance theory, and hylomorphism. This paper is part of a larger project attempting to show that each of these four theories is incompatible with metaphysical naturalism (which of course creates a problem for that view, if indeed these four theories are the only potentially workable options). To that end, I explicate and defend the following argument: Premise 1: Prime matter either can exist on its own (unactualized by substantial form) or it cannot. Premise 2: If prime matter can exist on its own (unactualized by substantial form) then metaphysical naturalism is false. Premise 3: If prime matter cannot exist on its own (unactualized by substantial form) then metaphysical naturalism is false. Conclusion; Therefore, either way, metaphysical naturalism is false.
K1 Hylomorphism
K1 Metaphysics
K1 Naturalism
K1 Ontology
K1 Realism
DO 10.5840/acpaproc20171357