Why Friendship Justifies Becoming
In his discussions of justice and of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appeals frequentlywithout much explanationto temporal considerations. I take these indications as a key for sorting out the systematic significance of Aristotle's claim that when people are friends, there is...
Main Author: | |
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
[publisher not identified]
[2016]
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In: |
Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
Year: 2016, Volume: 90, Pages: 109-119 |
IxTheo Classification: | NCB Personal ethics NCD Political ethics VA Philosophy |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | In his discussions of justice and of friendship in the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle appeals frequentlywithout much explanationto temporal considerations. I take these indications as a key for sorting out the systematic significance of Aristotle's claim that when people are friends, there is no need for justice (NE VIII.1.1155a26). Anaximander's fragmentary claim that coming-to-be is itself an injustice serves as a touchstone for the analysis; I ask whether and how Aristotle might agree with such a claim. I first isolate some problems, especially those involving time, that underlie Aristotle's various dialectical articulations of justice in NE V and show that friendship addresses them more beautifully than does justice. Then I try to establish that the ultimate work of friendship is to alter human temporality, interweaving multiple particular lives into a whole that both imitates and fits into the cosmic whole. |
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ISSN: | 2153-7925 |
Contains: | Enthalten in: American Catholic Philosophical Association, Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.5840/acpaproc2017111667 |