Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?

Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism pre...

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Détails bibliographiques
Publié dans:International journal for the study of skepticism
Auteur principal: Hill, Jonathan (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: Brill 2018
Dans: International journal for the study of skepticism
Année: 2018, Volume: 8, Numéro: 1, Pages: 31-50
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Scepticisme / Libre arbitre
Sujets non-standardisés:B Scepticism doxastic voluntarism Sextus Empiricus Descartes Huet Hume La Forge
Accès en ligne: Volltext (Verlag)
Description
Résumé:Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does presuppose voluntarism, but the other does not. Moreover, alternative versions of the narrative are available. I conclude that scepticism does not presuppose voluntarism.
ISSN:2210-5700
Contient:In: International journal for the study of skepticism
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001226