Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?
Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism pre...
| Publicado en: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
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| Autor principal: | |
| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Publicado: |
Brill
2018
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| En: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
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| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Escepticismo
/ Libre albedrío
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| Otras palabras clave: | B
Scepticism
doxastic voluntarism
Sextus Empiricus
Descartes
Huet
Hume
La Forge
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| Acceso en línea: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Sumario: | Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does presuppose voluntarism, but the other does not. Moreover, alternative versions of the narrative are available. I conclude that scepticism does not presuppose voluntarism. |
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| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Obras secundarias: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001226 |