Does Scepticism Presuppose Voluntarism?
Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism pre...
| Τόπος έκδοσης: | International journal for the study of skepticism |
|---|---|
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
Brill
2018
|
| Στο/Στη: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Έτος: 2018, Τόμος: 8, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 31-50 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Σκεπτικισμός
/ Ελεύθερη βούληση <μοτίβο>
|
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Scepticism
doxastic voluntarism
Sextus Empiricus
Descartes
Huet
Hume
La Forge
|
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) |
| Σύνοψη: | Philosophical scepticism is sometimes thought to presuppose doxastic voluntarism, the claim that we are able to believe or disbelieve propositions at will. This is problematic given that doxastic voluntarism itself is a controversial position. I examine two arguments for the view that scepticism presupposes voluntarism. I show that they rely on different versions of a depiction of scepticism as a conversion narrative. I argue that one version of this narrative does presuppose voluntarism, but the other does not. Moreover, alternative versions of the narrative are available. I conclude that scepticism does not presuppose voluntarism. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 2210-5700 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | In: International journal for the study of skepticism
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1163/22105700-00001226 |