Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis
According to epistemological disjunctivism I can claim to know facts about the world around me on the basis of my perceptual experience. My possession of such knowledge is incompatible with a number of familiar skeptical scenarios (for example, that I am currently being deceived by an evil demon). S...
| 主要作者: | |
|---|---|
| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
|
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
2018
|
| In: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Year: 2018, 卷: 8, 发布: 1, Pages: 1-30 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
McDowell, John Henry 1942-
/ Epistemische Logik
/ Disjunktion (逻辑)
|
| Further subjects: | B
epistemological disjunctivism
skeptical scenarios
John McDowell
Duncan Pritchard
|
| 在线阅读: |
Volltext (Publisher) |
