Epistemological Disjunctivism and the Random Demon Hypothesis
According to epistemological disjunctivism I can claim to know facts about the world around me on the basis of my perceptual experience. My possession of such knowledge is incompatible with a number of familiar skeptical scenarios (for example, that I am currently being deceived by an evil demon). S...
Autor principal: | |
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Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
Idioma: | Inglês |
Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Publicado em: |
2018
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Em: |
International journal for the study of skepticism
Ano: 2018, Volume: 8, Número: 1, Páginas: 1-30 |
(Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
McDowell, John Henry 1942-
/ Lógica epistêmica
/ Disjunção lógica (Lógica)
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Outras palavras-chave: | B
epistemological disjunctivism
skeptical scenarios
John McDowell
Duncan Pritchard
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Acesso em linha: |
Volltext (Publisher) |