The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism
J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
[2017]
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| Στο/Στη: |
Religious studies
Έτος: 2017, Τόμος: 53, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 97-116 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Schellenberg, J. L. 1959-
/ Σκεπτικισμός
/ Υπέρτατο Ον
/ Ταπεινοφροσύνη <μοτίβο>
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism - the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously - is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000475 |
