RT Article
T1 The power of humility in sceptical religion: why Ietsism is preferable to J. L. Schellenberg's Ultimism
JF Religious studies
VO 53
IS 1
SP 97
OP 116
A1 Elliott, J. K. 1943-2024
LA English
YR 2017
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1569786305
AB J. L. Schellenberg's Philosophy of Religion argues for a specific brand of sceptical religion that takes ‘Ultimism' - the proposition that there is a metaphysically, axiologically, and soteriologically ultimate reality - to be the object to which the sceptical religionist should assent. In this article I shall argue that Ietsism - the proposition that there is merely something transcendental worth committing ourselves to religiously - is a preferable object of assent. This is for two primary reasons. First, Ietsism is far more modest than Ultimism; Ietsism, in fact, is open to the truth of Ultimism, while the converse does not hold. Second, Ietsism can fulfil the same criteria that compel Schellenberg to argue for Ultimism.
DO 10.1017/S0034412515000475