Another look at Hume's treatment of the argument from design in the Natural History of Religion
This article argues that Hume's seemingly peculiar treatment of the argument from design in his Natural History of Religion is not indicative of a radical, or even modest, shift in his overall epistemic evaluation of it. His focus is on the argument's impact on the psychology of religious...
Main Author: | |
---|---|
Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
Published: |
Cambridge Univ. Press
[2016]
|
In: |
Religious studies
Year: 2016, Volume: 52, Issue: 4, Pages: 461-474 |
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Hume, David 1711-1776, Four dissertations
/ Natural religion
/ Teleology
|
IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism VA Philosophy |
Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
Summary: | This article argues that Hume's seemingly peculiar treatment of the argument from design in his Natural History of Religion is not indicative of a radical, or even modest, shift in his overall epistemic evaluation of it. His focus is on the argument's impact on the psychology of religious believers, and not its rational acceptability. Hume never strays far from his stated intention for the work, to engage in a socio-psychological analysis of the nature of religious belief, including a thorough assessment of the role of the argument from design. Hume concludes that the argument is inconsequential to religious belief formation. |
---|---|
ISSN: | 1469-901X |
Contains: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
|
Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412516000068 |