Augustine on will, freedom, and foreknowledge: De libero arbitrio, III, 1-3
Towards the beginning of the third book of De libero arbitrio, Augustine defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine's reasons for thinking that the will is essen...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2016]
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| В: |
Religious studies
Год: 2016, Том: 52, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 315-332 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Augustinus, Aurelius, Святой (мотив) 354-430, De libero arbitrio. 3
/ Свобода воли (мотив)
/ Предвидение
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| Индексация IxTheo: | KAB Раннее христианство |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Итог: | Towards the beginning of the third book of De libero arbitrio, Augustine defends the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. His defence appears to involve the idea that the will is essentially free. I discuss and evaluate Augustine's reasons for thinking that the will is essentially free, and the way that Augustine moves from the essential freedom of the will to the compatibility of human freedom and divine foreknowledge. |
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| ISSN: | 1469-901X |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Religious studies
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1017/S0034412515000165 |
