Ordinary morality does not imply atheism
Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these argum...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Recurso Electrónico Artigo |
| Idioma: | Inglês |
| Verificar disponibilidade: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Carregar...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado em: |
[2018]
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| Em: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Ano: 2018, Volume: 83, Número: 1, Páginas: 85-96 |
| (Cadeias de) Palavra- chave padrão: | B
Moral
/ Sofrimento
/ Prova moral da existência de Deus
/ Ateísmo
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| Outras palavras-chave: | B
Atheism
B Morality B Evil B Theodicy B Stephen Maitzen B God |
| Acesso em linha: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Resumo: | Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundárias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9589-7 |