Ordinary morality does not imply atheism
Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these argum...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Caricamento...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2018]
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2018, Volume: 83, Fascicolo: 1, Pagine: 85-96 |
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Morale
/ Sofferenza
/ Prova morale dell'esistenza di Dio
/ Ateismo
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| Altre parole chiave: | B
Atheism
B Morality B Evil B Theodicy B Stephen Maitzen B God |
| Accesso online: |
Accesso probabilmente gratuito Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Riepilogo: | Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Comprende: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9589-7 |