Ordinary morality does not imply atheism
Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these argum...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | En cours de chargement...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2018]
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| Dans: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2018, Volume: 83, Numéro: 1, Pages: 85-96 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Morale
/ Souffrance
/ Preuve morale de l’existence de Dieu
/ Athéisme
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| Sujets non-standardisés: | B
Atheism
B Morality B Evil B Theodicy B Stephen Maitzen B God |
| Accès en ligne: |
Accès probablement gratuit Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Résumé: | Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contient: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9589-7 |