Ordinary morality does not imply atheism

Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these argum...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Byerly, T. Ryan 1985- (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: [2018]
Dans: International journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2018, Volume: 83, Numéro: 1, Pages: 85-96
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Morale / Souffrance / Preuve morale de l’existence de Dieu / Athéisme
Sujets non-standardisés:B Atheism
B Morality
B Evil
B Theodicy
B Stephen Maitzen
B God
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Résumé:Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering.
ISSN:1572-8684
Contient:Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9589-7