Ordinary morality does not imply atheism
Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these argum...
| Autor principal: | |
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| Tipo de documento: | Electrónico Artículo |
| Lenguaje: | Inglés |
| Verificar disponibilidad: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Gargar...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publicado: |
[2018]
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| En: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Año: 2018, Volumen: 83, Número: 1, Páginas: 85-96 |
| (Cadenas de) Palabra clave estándar: | B
Moral
/ Sufrimiento
/ Prueba moral de la existencia de Dios
/ Ateísmo
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| Otras palabras clave: | B
Atheism
B Morality B Evil B Theodicy B Stephen Maitzen B God |
| Acceso en línea: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| Sumario: | Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Obras secundarias: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9589-7 |