Ordinary morality does not imply atheism
Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these argum...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Journals Online & Print: | |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
[2018]
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Στο/Στη: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2018, Τόμος: 83, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 85-96 |
Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Ήθος (μοτίβο)
/ Πόνος <μοτίβο>
/ Ηθική απόδειξη της ύπαρξης του Θεού
/ Αθεϊσμός (μοτίβο)
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Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Atheism
B Morality B Evil B Theodicy B Stephen Maitzen B God |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Πιθανολογούμενα δωρεάν πρόσβαση Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
Σύνοψη: | Many theist as well as many atheist philosophers have maintained that if God exists, then every instance of undeserved, unwanted suffering ultimately benefits the sufferer. Recently, several authors have argued that this implication of theism conflicts with ordinary morality. I show that these arguments all rest on a common mistake. Defenders of these arguments overlook the role of merely potential instances of suffering in determining our moral obligations toward suffering. |
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ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9589-7 |