A dilemma for the soul theory of personal identity
The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P at time T is numerically identical with a person P at a later time T, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in v...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | 载入...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2018]
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| In: |
International journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2018, 卷: 83, 发布: 1, Pages: 41-55 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
灵魂转世
/ 个人
/ 身份
/ 心物问题
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| Further subjects: | B
Souls
B Persistence over time B Bodily and psychological continuity B Personal Identity |
| 在线阅读: |
Presumably Free Access Volltext (lizenzpflichtig) |
| 总结: | The problem of diachronic personal identity is this: what explains why a person P at time T is numerically identical with a person P at a later time T, even if they are not at those times qualitatively identical? One traditional explanation is the soul theory, according to which persons persist in virtue of their nonphysical souls. I argue here that this view faces a new and arguably insuperable dilemma: either (a) souls, like physical bodies, change over time, in which case the soul theory faces an analogue problem of diachronic soul identity, or (b) souls, unlike physical bodies, do not change over time, in which case the soul theory cannot explain why souls relate to particular bodies over time and so at best only partially explains personal identity. I conclude that the soul theory fares no better than physicalist-friendly accounts of personal identity such as bodily- or psychological-continuity-based views. |
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| ISSN: | 1572-8684 |
| Contains: | Enthalten in: International journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11153-016-9594-x |
