An Egalitarian Argument against Reducing Deprivation

Deprivations normally give rise to undeserved inequality. It is commonly thought that one way of improving a situation with respect to equality is by reducing the incidence of deprivations. In this paper I argue that there is at least one respect in which reducing the incidence of deprivations can m...

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Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: Mosquera, Julia (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
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Publié: [2017]
Dans: Ethical theory and moral practice
Année: 2017, Volume: 20, Numéro: 5, Pages: 957-968
Classifications IxTheo:NCC Éthique sociale
VA Philosophie
Sujets non-standardisés:B Larry Temkin
B Deprivations
B Population ethics
B Egalitarianism
B Inequality
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Résumé:Deprivations normally give rise to undeserved inequality. It is commonly thought that one way of improving a situation with respect to equality is by reducing the incidence of deprivations. In this paper I argue that there is at least one respect in which reducing the incidence of deprivations can make things worse from the point of view of equality. While eliminating deprivations leads to the elimination of inequalities, reducing the incidence of deprivations leads to an uneven distribution of the pairwise relations of inequality of a population, which leads to the concentration of pairwise relations of inequality in the worse off. If my argument is correct, egalitarians have reasons to broaden their dimensions of concern: egalitarians should not only be concerned about the unequal distribution of goods, but also about the unequal distribution of pairwise relations of inequality of a population.
ISSN:1572-8447
Contient:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9842-x