From Welfare to Rights without Changing the Subject

In this paper I introduce the ‘changing the subject’ problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from...

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Detalhes bibliográficos
Autor principal: Hadley, John 1966- (Author)
Tipo de documento: Recurso Electrónico Artigo
Idioma:Inglês
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publicado em: [2017]
Em: Ethical theory and moral practice
Ano: 2017, Volume: 20, Número: 5, Páginas: 993-1004
Classificações IxTheo:NCG Ética ecológica ; ética da criação
VA Filosofia
Outras palavras-chave:B Noncognitivism
B Respect
B Wellbeing
B Expressivism
B animal ethics
B Circuses
B Dignity
B Rights
B Animals
B Pain
B Welfare
B Animal welfare
B Animal Rights
Acesso em linha: Volltext (Publisher)
Volltext (doi)
Descrição
Resumo:In this paper I introduce the ‘changing the subject’ problem. When proponents of animal protection use terms such as dignity and respect they can be fairly accused of shifting debate from welfare to rights because the terms purportedly refer to properties and values that are logically distinct from the capacity to suffer and the moral significance of causing animals pain. To avoid this problem and ensure that debate proceeds in the familiar terms of the established welfare paradigm, I present an expressivist analysis of animal rights vocabulary. When terms such as dignity and respect are understood in line with the theory of moral language use known as expressivism, proponents of animal protection that use these terms can escape the charge of changing the subject. Drawing upon Helm’s theory of love, I show how the usage of rights vocabulary can be respectable way for people to register their concern for the welfare of animals, even at times when it is unlikely that the animals concerned are suffering. Tying rights vocabulary to welfare via expressivism aligns the aims of animal rights with welfare without the theoretical problems associated with attempts to ‘reduce’ dignity or respect to natural behaviour or inherent value.
ISSN:1572-8447
Obras secundárias:Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s10677-017-9856-4