God, Evil, and Evolution
Most evil is compatible with the existence of God if He has an aim that He can achieve only by using an unguided process of evolution and if He cannot be condemned for trying to achieve His aim. It is argued that there is an aim that could reasonably be attributed to God and that God cannot achieve...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Έκδοση: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2010]
|
| Στο/Στη: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2010, Τόμος: 2, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 201-217 |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Παράλληλη έκδοση: | Μη ηλεκτρονικά
|
| Σύνοψη: | Most evil is compatible with the existence of God if He has an aim that He can achieve only by using an unguided process of evolution and if He cannot be condemned for trying to achieve His aim. It is argued that there is an aim that could reasonably be attributed to God and that God cannot achieve it without using evolution. There are independent grounds for thinking an evolutionary response is necessary if God is to be defended at all. Issues that require further investigation are pointed out and desirable features of the evolutionary response indicated. |
|---|---|
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v2i2.374 |