Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency
In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and t...
| Главный автор: | |
|---|---|
| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2015]
|
| В: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Год: 2015, Том: 7, Выпуск: 3, Страницы: 67-78 |
| Нормированные ключевые слова (последовательности): | B
Бог (мотив)
/ Действие (литература)
/ Свобода воли (мотив)
/ Детерминизм
|
| Индексация IxTheo: | AB Философия религии NBC Бог |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Итог: | In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations. |
|---|---|
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.105 |
