Agency Incompatibilism and Divine Agency
In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and t...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2015]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, 卷: 7, 發布: 3, Pages: 67-78 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
神
/ 情節
/ 自由意志
/ 決定論
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism NBC Doctrine of God |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| 總結: | In this paper, I consider whether an argument for compatibilism about free will and determinism might be developed from the thought that Gods agency seems consistent with the rational determination of at least some divine actions by the True and the Good. I attempt to develop such an argument and then consider how to respond to it from the point of view of my own position, which I call Agency Incompatibilism. I argue that a crucial premise in the argument is ambiguous and offer responses to the argument on behalf of the Agency Incompatibilist, on each of the two disambiguations. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.105 |
