On Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism
Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true...
| Auteur principal: | |
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| Type de support: | Électronique Article |
| Langue: | Anglais |
| Vérifier la disponibilité: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Publié: |
[2016]
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| Dans: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2016, Volume: 8, Numéro: 4, Pages: 195-212 |
| Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés: | B
Platonisme
/ Dieu
/ Conceptualisme
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| Classifications IxTheo: | AB Philosophie de la religion |
| Accès en ligne: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Résumé: | Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true and we should therefore identify propositions with the contents of a divine mind, i.e., God. In this paper, I argue that Gould and Davis argument against Propositional Platonism fails since it depends upon a number of assumptions that the Propositional Platonist need not accept. |
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| Contient: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1763 |
