On Propositional Platonism, Representation, and Divine Conceptualism
Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true...
| Autore principale: | |
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| Tipo di documento: | Elettronico Articolo |
| Lingua: | Inglese |
| Verificare la disponibilità: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Pubblicazione: |
[2016]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Anno: 2016, Volume: 8, Fascicolo: 4, Pagine: 195-212 |
| (sequenze di) soggetti normati: | B
Platonismo
/ Dio
/ Concettualismo
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| Notazioni IxTheo: | AB Filosofia delle religioni |
| Accesso online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Riepilogo: | Gould and Davis (2014) have recently argued for the claim that Propositional Platonism is mistaken since it is not able to explain how a proposition comes to bear its representational properties. But, say Gould and Davis, if Propositional Platonism is mistaken, then Divine Conceptualism must be true and we should therefore identify propositions with the contents of a divine mind, i.e., God. In this paper, I argue that Gould and Davis argument against Propositional Platonism fails since it depends upon a number of assumptions that the Propositional Platonist need not accept. |
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| Comprende: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i4.1763 |
