The Practice of Assertion under Conditions of Religious Ignorance
The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic...
| 主要作者: | |
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| 格式: | 电子 文件 |
| 语言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2017]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2017, 卷: 9, 发布: 1, Pages: 27-39 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
信念
/ 自作主张
/ 宗教
/ 不知道
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism AG Religious life; material religion |
| 在线阅读: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| 总结: | The knowledge and attendant justification norms of belief and assertion serve to regulate our doxastic attitudes towards, and practices of asserting, various propositions. I argue that conforming to these norms under conditions of religious ignorance promotes responsible acts of assertion, epistemic humility, and non-dogmatic doxastic attitudes towards the content of ones own faith. Such conformity also facilitates the formation of the religious personality in a healthy direction in other ways. I explore these ideas in relation to the Christian faith tradition, but my reflections generalize. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v9i1.1863 |
