Zagzebski on Rationality
This paper examines Linda Zagzebskis (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular,...
| 主要作者: | |
|---|---|
| 其他作者: | |
| 格式: | 電子 Article |
| 語言: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| 出版: |
[2014]
|
| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, 卷: 6, 發布: 4, Pages: 39-46 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Zagzebski, Linda Trinkaus 1946-, Epistemic authority
/ 理智
|
| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| 在線閱讀: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| 總結: | This paper examines Linda Zagzebskis (2012) account of rationality, as set out in her rich, wide-ranging, and important book, Epistemic Authority: A Theory of Trust, Authority, and Autonomy in Belief. We briefly describe the account that she offers and then consider its plausibility. In particular, in the first section we argue that a number of Zagzebskis claims with regard to rationality require more support than she offers for them. Moreover, in the second section, we contend that far from offering Zagzebski a quick way of dealing with radical scepticism, her account of rationality actually seems to be particularly vulnerable to this problem. |
|---|---|
| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i4.143 |
