The Non-Aristotelian Virtue of Truth from the Second-Person Perspective
The claim has been made that when Aquinas speaks about the virtue of truth and its opposing vices in the Summa theologiae (ST) 2-2.109-113, he regards himself as speaking of the same virtue of truth as found in the Nicomachean Ethics 4.7. In this paper, I dispute this claim, showing how Aquinass ac...
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Format: | Electronic Article |
Language: | English |
Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
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Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2013]
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In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2013, Volume: 5, Issue: 4, Pages: 87-104 |
Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Parallel Edition: | Non-electronic
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