Epistemological Foundations for Koons' Cosmological Argument?

Some people—including the present author—have proposed and defended alternative restricted causal principles that block Robert Koons’ ‘new’ cosmological argument without undermining the intuition that causation is very close to ubiquitous. In ‘Epistemological Foundations for the Cosmological Argumen...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Oppy, Graham (Author)
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
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Published: University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham [2010]
In: European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2010, Volume: 2, Issue: 1, Pages: 107-125
Online Access: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
Parallel Edition:Non-electronic

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