Richard Swinburne's Concept of Religious Experience. An Analysis and Critique
The so-called argument from religious experience plays a prominent role in todays analytical philosophy of religion. It is also of considerable importance to richard Swinburnes apologetic project. However, rather than joining the polyphonic debate around this argument, the present paper examines...
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| Contributors: | |
| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
[2014]
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| In: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2014, Volume: 6, Issue: 1, Pages: 177-198 |
| Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains: | B
Swinburne, Richard 1934-
/ Religious experience
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| IxTheo Classification: | AB Philosophy of religion; criticism of religion; atheism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Summary: | The so-called argument from religious experience plays a prominent role in todays analytical philosophy of religion. It is also of considerable importance to richard Swinburnes apologetic project. However, rather than joining the polyphonic debate around this argument, the present paper examines the fundamental concept of religious experience. The upshot is that Swinburne neither develops a convincing concept of experience nor explains what makes a religious experience religious. The first section examines some problems resulting mainly from terminology, specifically Swinburnes use of appear-words as success-verbs. While these problems might be resolved by a recurrence to the observer, the second and third part of our paper present problems not so easily resolved: namely, that Swinburnes concept of experience as conscious mental events is too broad and inaccurate for its role in the argument given (Section 2); and that Swinburne does not even attempt to figure out which features of an experience, when present, turn an experience simpliciter into a distinctly religious experience (Section 3). Section 4, in conclusion, outlines possible reasons for this unusual and remarkable inaccuracy in conceptualisation. |
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| Contains: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v6i1.197 |