Four (Or So) New Fine-Tuning Arguments

Both proponents and opponents of the argument for the deliberate fine-tuning, by an intelligent agent, of the fundamental constants of the universe have accepted certain assumptions about how the argument will go. These include both treating the fine-tuning of the constants as constitutive of the na...

Description complète

Enregistré dans:  
Détails bibliographiques
Auteur principal: McGrew, Lydia (Auteur)
Type de support: Électronique Article
Langue:Anglais
Vérifier la disponibilité: HBZ Gateway
Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
Publié: [2016]
Dans: European journal for philosophy of religion
Année: 2016, Volume: 8, Numéro: 2, Pages: 85-106
Sujets / Chaînes de mots-clés standardisés:B Cosmologie / Constante physique / Dessein intelligent
Classifications IxTheo:AB Philosophie de la religion
Accès en ligne: Volltext (doi)
Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei)
Description
Résumé:Both proponents and opponents of the argument for the deliberate fine-tuning, by an intelligent agent, of the fundamental constants of the universe have accepted certain assumptions about how the argument will go. These include both treating the fine-tuning of the constants as constitutive of the nature of the universe itself and conditioning on the fact that the constants actually do fall into the life-permitting range, rather than on the narrowness of the range. It is also generally assumed that the fine-tuning argument should precede biological arguments for design from, e.g., the origin of life. I suggest four new arguments, two of which are different orderings of the same data. Each of these abandons one or more of the common assumptions about how the fine-tuning argument should go, and they provide new possibilities for answering or avoiding objections to the fine-tuning argument.
Contient:Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.59