Four (Or So) New Fine-Tuning Arguments
Both proponents and opponents of the argument for the deliberate fine-tuning, by an intelligent agent, of the fundamental constants of the universe have accepted certain assumptions about how the argument will go. These include both treating the fine-tuning of the constants as constitutive of the na...
Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
Έκδοση: |
[2016]
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Στο/Στη: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2016, Τόμος: 8, Τεύχος: 2, Σελίδες: 85-106 |
Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Κοσμολογία (μοτίβο)
/ Φυσική σταθερά
/ Ευφυής σχεδιασμός
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Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός |
Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
Σύνοψη: | Both proponents and opponents of the argument for the deliberate fine-tuning, by an intelligent agent, of the fundamental constants of the universe have accepted certain assumptions about how the argument will go. These include both treating the fine-tuning of the constants as constitutive of the nature of the universe itself and conditioning on the fact that the constants actually do fall into the life-permitting range, rather than on the narrowness of the range. It is also generally assumed that the fine-tuning argument should precede biological arguments for design from, e.g., the origin of life. I suggest four new arguments, two of which are different orderings of the same data. Each of these abandons one or more of the common assumptions about how the fine-tuning argument should go, and they provide new possibilities for answering or avoiding objections to the fine-tuning argument. |
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Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v8i2.59 |