How Are We to Think of God's Freedom?
The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCanns, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and be...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
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| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
[2015]
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| Στο/Στη: |
European journal for philosophy of religion
Έτος: 2015, Τόμος: 7, Τεύχος: 3, Σελίδες: 49-65 |
| Τυποποιημένες (ακολουθίες) λέξεων-κλειδιών: | B
Θεός (μοτίβο)
/ Ελεύθερη βούληση <μοτίβο>
/ Ελευθερία (μοτίβο)
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| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | AB Φιλοσοφία της θρησκείας, Κριτική της θρησκείας, Αθεϊσμός NBC Δόγμα του Θεού |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (doi) Volltext (teilw. kostenfrei) |
| Σύνοψη: | The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCanns, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of Gods freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason to do so. |
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| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: European journal for philosophy of religion
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.104 |
