RT Article
T1 How Are We to Think of God's Freedom?
JF European journal for philosophy of religion
VO 7
IS 3
SP 49
OP 65
A1 Helm, Paul 1940-
LA English
PB University of Innsbruck in cooperation with the John Hick Centre for Philosophy of Religion at the University of Birmingham
YR 2015
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/1567180892
AB The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCann’s, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of God’s freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason to do so.
DO 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.104