How Are We to Think of God's Freedom?

The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCann’s, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and be...

Full description

Saved in:
Bibliographic Details
Published in:European journal for philosophy of religion
Main Author: Helm, Paul 1940-
Format: Electronic Article
Language:English
Check availability: HBZ Gateway
Published: [2015]
In:European journal for philosophy of religion
Year: 2015, Volume: 7, Issue: 3, Pages: 49-65
Standardized Subjects / Keyword chains:B God / Free will / Freedom
Online Access: Volltext (Teilw. Kostenfrei)
doi
Description
Summary:The paper discusses two conceptions of divine freedom. The first, Hugh McCann’s, proposes that God is a timelessly eternal act, whose agency is not deliberative and who, in that act, creates himself and the contents of his will. God is such an act. Following discussion of this view, its costs and benefits, a more traditional account of God’s freedom, in which he possesses vestigial alternativity, the freedom to choose an alternative should there have been a sufficient reason to do so.
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.24204/ejpr.v7i3.104