RT Article
T1 From Emergence Theory to Panpsychism: —A Philosophical Evaluation of Nancey Murphy’s Non-reductive Physicalism
JF Sophia
VO 55
IS 3
SP 381
OP 394
A1 Leidenhag, Mikael
LA English
YR 2016
UL https://ixtheo.de/Record/156587160X
AB In this article, I offer a critical evaluation of non-reductive physicalism as articulated and defended by Nancey Murphy. I argue that (A) the examples given by Murphy do not illustrate robust emergence and the philosophical idea of downward causation. (B) The thesis of multiple realizability is ontologically neutral, and so cannot support the idea of the causal efficacy of higher-level properties. (C) Supervenience is incompatible with strong emergence. I also argue for the fruitful relationship between emergence theory and panpsychism pertaining to the metaphysical issue of the origin and nature of mind.
K1 Causal powers
K1 emergence theory
K1 Nancey Murphy
K1 Panpsychism
DO 10.1007/s11841-016-0550-0