Rawlsian Liberalism, Justice for the Worst Off, and the Limited Capacity of Political Institutions

This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursu...

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主要作者: Cross, Ben (Author)
格式: 电子 文件
语言:English
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Interlibrary Loan:Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany)
出版: [2016]
In: Sophia
Year: 2016, 卷: 55, 发布: 2, Pages: 215-236
IxTheo Classification:NCC Social ethics
NCD Political ethics
VA Philosophy
ZC Politics in general
Further subjects:B Difference Principle
B John Rawls
B Publicity
B Virtue
B Equality
B G.A. Cohen
在线阅读: Volltext (Publisher)
Volltext (doi)
实物特征
总结:This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursuing certain non-taxation-based courses of action that are designed to alter the work choices of citizens (NTMs). Second, I argue that such actions are not permissible for Rawlsian institutions. It follows that a state governed by a Rawls-type political conception of justice is parasitic on the willingness of citizens to be sufficiently motivated by concern for the worst off, but it cannot require or even encourage them to be so motivated.
ISSN:1873-930X
Contains:Enthalten in: Sophia
Persistent identifiers:DOI: 10.1007/s11841-015-0486-9