Rawlsian Liberalism, Justice for the Worst Off, and the Limited Capacity of Political Institutions
This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursu...
| Главный автор: | |
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| Формат: | Электронный ресурс Статья |
| Язык: | Английский |
| Проверить наличие: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Загрузка...
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| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Опубликовано: |
[2016]
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| В: |
Sophia
Год: 2016, Том: 55, Выпуск: 2, Страницы: 215-236 |
| Индексация IxTheo: | NCC Социальная этика NCD Политическая этика VA Философия ZC Общая политика |
| Другие ключевые слова: | B
Difference Principle
B John Rawls B Publicity B Virtue B Equality B G.A. Cohen |
| Online-ссылка: |
Volltext (Publisher) Volltext (doi) |
| Итог: | This article argues that Rawlsian liberal political institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic welfare needs of the worst off are met. This argument consists of two steps. First, I show that institutions are incapable of ensuring that the basic needs of the worst off are met without pursuing certain non-taxation-based courses of action that are designed to alter the work choices of citizens (NTMs). Second, I argue that such actions are not permissible for Rawlsian institutions. It follows that a state governed by a Rawls-type political conception of justice is parasitic on the willingness of citizens to be sufficiently motivated by concern for the worst off, but it cannot require or even encourage them to be so motivated. |
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| ISSN: | 1873-930X |
| Второстепенные работы: | Enthalten in: Sophia
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| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s11841-015-0486-9 |
