Moral Progress and Human Agency
The idea of moral progress is a necessary presupposition of action for beings like us. We must believe that moral progress is possible and that it might have been realized in human experience, if we are to be confident that continued human action can have any morally constructive point. I discuss th...
| Κύριος συγγραφέας: | |
|---|---|
| Τύπος μέσου: | Ηλεκτρονική πηγή Άρθρο |
| Γλώσσα: | Αγγλικά |
| Έλεγχος διαθεσιμότητας: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Φόρτωση...
|
| Interlibrary Loan: | Interlibrary Loan for the Fachinformationsdienste (Specialized Information Services in Germany) |
| Έκδοση: |
[2017]
|
| Στο/Στη: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Έτος: 2017, Τόμος: 20, Τεύχος: 1, Σελίδες: 153-168 |
| Σημειογραφίες IxTheo: | NCA Ηθική ΖΒ Κοινωνιολογία ZD Ψυχολογία |
| Άλλες λέξεις-κλειδιά: | B
Moral Progress
B Moral Agency B Moral Psychology |
| Διαθέσιμο Online: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |
| Σύνοψη: | The idea of moral progress is a necessary presupposition of action for beings like us. We must believe that moral progress is possible and that it might have been realized in human experience, if we are to be confident that continued human action can have any morally constructive point. I discuss the implications of this truth for moral psychology. I also show that once we understand the complex nature and the complicated social sources of moral progress, we will appreciate why we cannot construct a plausible comprehensive action-guiding theory of moral progress. Yet while the nature and sources of moral progress consistently thwart many theoretical hopes, the idea of moral progress is a plausible, critically important and morally constructive principle of historical interpretation. |
|---|---|
| ISSN: | 1572-8447 |
| Περιλαμβάνει: | Enthalten in: Ethical theory and moral practice
|
| Persistent identifiers: | DOI: 10.1007/s10677-016-9748-z |