Reasons, Determinism and the Ability to Do otherwise
It has been argued that in a deterministic universe, no one has any reason to do anything. Since we ought to do what we have most reason to do, no one ought to do anything either. Firstly, it is argued that an agent cannot have reason to do anything unless she can do otherwise; secondly, that the re...
| Main Author: | |
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| Format: | Electronic Article |
| Language: | English |
| Check availability: | HBZ Gateway |
| Journals Online & Print: | Drawer...
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| Fernleihe: | Fernleihe für die Fachinformationsdienste |
| Published: |
Springer Science + Business Media B. V
[2016]
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| In: |
Ethical theory and moral practice
Year: 2016, Volume: 19, Issue: 5, Pages: 1225-1240 |
| IxTheo Classification: | NCA Ethics VA Philosophy |
| Further subjects: | B
Determinism
B The ability to do otherwise B Compatibilism B Objective reasons B ought implies can B Incompatibilism |
| Online Access: |
Volltext (Verlag) Volltext (doi) |